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Abstract
The law of association, which is a generalization of Ricardo's law of comparative advan-
tage, is one of the most fundamental laws in economics, which explains the benefits of
international trade in the macroscopic level and the division of labour in the microscopic
one. However, the derivation of the law is traditionally based on aggregate production
criterions rather than on the producers' subjective preferences. An economic law, which
ignores subjective preferences cannot be regarded as a fundamental one. In this chapter,
a subjective analysis of the law is presented, to the best of our knowledge, for the first
time. It is shown that when subjective considerations are introduced the tendency to
trade can be reduced. An algorithm is presented to illustrate the dynamics of the
process, in which the information regarding the subjective preferences is transferred
via the previous trading prices. Furthermore, the effect of specialization on the produc-
tion frontiers, which is absent in most economics derivations of the law, is taken under
consideration. It is shown that even if both producers are identical a non-trading state is
unstable. It is therefore shown that counter to mainstream thinking, comparative advan-
tage is neither necessary nor is it a sufficient condition for trading.
Keywords: Ricardo, law of comparative advantage, law of association, subjective pref-
erence ranking, division of labour, trading
1. Introduction
The law of association (LA), which is a generalisation of Ricardo’s well-known law of compar-
ative advantage (LCA) [1–4], can be regarded as one of the main corner stones of both micro-
and macroeconomics. In the microscopic regime, it explains the motivation for basic trade, the
division of labour, allocations of goods and production preferences. In the macroscopic realm
not only does it shed light on international trading, but it is also a clear testimony for free
© 2017 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
trading and low tariffs. Despite its importance, this law is missing in most microeconomics and
macroeconomics textbooks.
The LCA is usually known as Ricardo’s law and we will also refer to it as such, albeit historical
justice requires citing the fact that it should have been attributed to James Mill (for a discussion
on this issue see Refs. [5, 6]).
Usually, the interested economists will find a discussion on the LCA in textbooks on interna-
tional trading [7] or textbooks on general economics [8]. However, in these cases, the discus-
sion usually focuses on international trading with a clear neglect of the law’s implication on
interpersonal exchange, namely, the LA.
A clear exception for this omission is the Austrian school of economics, which elaborates on
the LA even in its most basic textbooks (see Refs. [9, 10]). They used this law, as was initially
meant by Ricardo, to advocate for free trade and free interpersonal association, and as a tool to
explain the process behind the division of labour between nations and individual.
However, there is some discrepancy in the Austrian adoption of the LCA. The Austrian
school’s approach is to avoid aggregate economic parameters, and yet, they use the LA to
show that the aggregate production is raised due to trade. But does it mean that the conditions
of both producers were improved as a consequence of trading? Despite Mises and Rothbard’s
attempt to claim that the LA does indicate mutual benefit, a complete Austrian analysis
requires a subjective treatment, which is absent in their writings.
In all their writings, the Austrian economists stress that it is meaningless to discuss mutual
utility. Only individual utility has a meaning. Moreover, they stress that utility has only
ordinal meaning and not cardinal one [9, 10]. One can say that he prefers A over B, but it is
meaningless to say by how much.
Therefore, even comparison between different individual’s utility is, according to the Austrian
school, meaningless. It should be stressed that this understanding was adopted by most
modern schools of economics (on this subject see Ref. [11]).
The fact that two producers produce more of certain goods does not mean that they are
better off. The problem can easily be emphasised by the following example: Suppose one
individual is expert in making bread, and the other one is expert in making mud pies.
Should one conclude from the LA that they both have to focus on the product they are best
in producing? Surely not. The mud pie is useless for both. In this case, they both need to
be focusing on producing bread. There is no point in wasting resources on producing
mud pies.
Actually, it was Böhm-Bawerk, one of the prominent leaders of the Austrian school [12], who
used the ‘mud pie argument’ to attack the classical economists in general and Karl Marx in
particular for using the labour theory of value. The fact that a product ’costs‘ a certain amount
of labour does not mean that it has some value.
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The erroneous conclusions are a direct result of the absence of any subjective utility analysis in
the derivation of the LA.
For a complete analysis, the subjective scale of preferences of the two producers/traders has to
be incorporated in the analysis of the LA. The problem is that the traditional Austrian analysis
is based on verbal arguments or very basic preference schedule tables. An extensive subjective
Austrian treatment must incorporate two-dimensional preference matrices along the Ricardian’s
argument.
Another discrepancy arises in the literature in connection to specialisation. It was stated very
clearly bymany economists and can easily be grasped by the layman that specialisation increases
the productivity of every one of the merchants prior to trading. Nevertheless, this effect is also
neglected in the analysis or, at best, analysed separately from the benefits of trading.
See, for example, two contemporary economists (pages 4 and 48 in Ref. [7] and even Ref. [13]),
which both recognise that specialisation increases the productivity of each one of the pro-
ducers (not only the aggregate productivity), but they fail to incorporate this point in the LA
analysis.
It is the object of this chapter to fix these two problems and to analyse the LA with subjective
preferences and with the effect of specialisation.
2. The traditional Ricardo’s law of comparative advantage
Let there be two individuals (1 and 2), both of them can produce two consumption commod-
ities: A and B.
Let the maximum number of units of good A and of good B that the first individual (hereinaf-
ter we will adopt the title ’producer‘) produces are A1 and B1, respectively. Similarly, the
maximum number of units of the same goods (A and B) that the second producer produces
are A2 and B2, respectively. Therefore, the first producer is constrained by the equation
a1
A1
þ
b1
B1
≤ 1 ð1Þ
where a1 and b1 are the number of units the first individual produces, and similarly
a2
A2
þ
b2
B2
≤ 1 ð2Þ
where a2 and b2 are the number of units the second individual produces.
These constrain equations are usually termed: the production possibility frontier (PPF).
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Now if A1 > A2, but B1 < B2, then it is clear that the first producer has an absolute advantage
over the second one in producing units of good A and vice versa in producing units of good B.
In this case, it is clear that trading will be beneficial to both producers.
The novelty of the LA is the notion that even in the case where A1 > A2 and B1 > B2, where
clearly the second producer has no absolute advantage in the production of either commodi-
ties, they still can benefit from exchange.
If
A2
B2
<
A1
B1
ð3Þ
then, the first producer has a comparative advantage in producing A, while the second
producer has a comparative advantage in producing B. It is easy to see that in this case, there
is a common interest for the exchange. Suppose that ∆A units of A are exchanged for ∆B units
of B, i.e. the first producer sells ∆A units of A for ∆B units of B. Clearly, the first producer
would agree to this exchange provided the price, i.e. the ratio
p  ∆A/∆B obeys the inequality
p ¼
ΔA
ΔB
<
A1
B1
ð4Þ
Otherwise, this producer can produce the commodity instead of buying it. Similarly, the
second producer would agree to this exchange provided the price is larger than
p ¼
ΔA
ΔB
>
A2
B2
ð5Þ
for exactly the same reason.
Therefore, if inequality (3) holds, then there is a price regime in which they will both benefit
from the exchange. This is the traditional LA.
3. Production maximization analysis
Clearly, aggregate production analysis cannot justify the subjective behaviour of the pro-
ducers, however, the improvement in the producers’ status can be quantified by the excess
production with respect to the producer’s PPF. The reason for that is the producer is indifferent
to its position on the PPF. Thus, any improvement in its status is achieved by advancing in the
perpendicular direction to the production frontier.
If after trading the first producer has a1 units of A and b1 units of B and the second producer
has a2 units of A and b2 units of B, then the distances between their current status and their PPF
(which quantifies their production improvement) are
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ΔD1 ¼
a1=A1 þ b1=B1  1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
A21 þ B
2
1
q and ΔD2 ¼ a2=A2 þ b2=B2  1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
A22 þ B
2
2
q , ð6Þ
respectively. After trading ∆A units of A for ∆B units of B
ΔD1 ¼
ΔA=A1 þ ΔB=B1ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
A21 þ B
2
1
q and ΔD2 ¼ ΔA=A2  ΔB=B2ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
A22 þ B
2
2
q : ð7Þ
One can therefore evaluate the price p*, for which both producers have the same gain, i.e.
∆D1(p*) = ∆D2(p*),
p ¼
B2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
A21 þ B
2
1
q
þ B1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
A22 þ B
2
2
q
A2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
A21 þ B
2
1
q
þ A1
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
A22 þ B
2
2
q ¼ cosθ1 þ cosθ2
sinθ1 þ sinθ2
, ð8Þ
where tanθ1  A1=B1 and tanθ2  A2=B2: ð9Þ
At this price, the production gain of both producers is equal to
ΔD1ðp
Þ ¼ ΔD2ðp
Þ ¼ ΔA
sin ðjθ2  θ1jÞ
sinθ2 þ sinθ1
¼ ΔB
sin ðjθ2  θ1jÞ
cosθ2 þ cosθ1
ð10Þ
4. Subjective analysis
However, clearly something is missing in these production analysis. It is clear that production
in itself is not the economic goal. Hence, in what sense, the producer condition is better after
the exchange than before it?
One must assume that while the individuals have a comparative advantage in the production
of one of the goods, they want or need both of them, and in the process of analysing the best
option to act (producing or a combination of producing and trading), the individual chooses
the option, which yields the best combination of goods. But what is the best combination? An
evaluation method is required.Historically, the tool for situation evaluation was the utility
function. However, as was realised by the Austrian school of economics and was later accepted
among most economists [11], the situation preference ranking cannot have a cardinal meaning
(as the utility function suggest) but only ordinal one.
The problem is, that creating a list, i.e. a table, of preferences, when there are multiple param-
eters or many degrees of freedom, is doable, but cumbersome and complicates the economic
analysis. This may be the reason, that Rothbard, which used several times lists of preferences,
used them only in relatively simple cases. In the problem under discussion, the actors are both
producers and traders. Their decisions are based on two stages.
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In what follows, we introduce the actors’ ranking matrices: R1(a1,b1) and R2(a2,b2). That is,
every state of the first producer is described by two parameter: the number of units in his/her
possession of commodity A (a1) and of commodity B (b1). Similarly, the states of the second
producer are described by the equivalent parameter a2 and b2, respectively. Therefore, instead
of presenting the scenarios as a single list, which includes all options, we present them with
two two-dimensional matrices R1(a1,b1) and R2(a2,b2).
Clearly, since A and B are goods, the utility increases with the number of units, i.e.
Rnðan þ 1, bnÞ > Rnðan, bnÞ and Rnðan, bn þ 1Þ > Rnðan, bnÞ ð11Þ
for n = 1,2.
In the limit where the units of the goods are arbitrarily small, the continuum limit can be used,
in which case, Eq. (11) can be written as ∂Rnðan, bnÞ
∂an
> 0 and ∂Rnðan, bnÞ
∂bn
> 0.
The law of diminishing marginal utility (LDMU) is traditionally formulated by demanding
a concave shape for the utility function. However, in the absence of a utility function, it is
meaningless to apply this criterion on the preference ranking matrix. A better approach is
to notice that the decline in the marginal utility of a certain good is actually manifested
by the relative increase in the ranking of other goods. Therefore, the LDMU can be stated
mathematically as
Rða, bþ 1Þ  Rða, bÞ ≤Rðaþ 1, bþ 1Þ  Rðaþ 1, bÞ
Or, equivalently, in a more symmetric form
Rða, bþ 1Þ þ Rðaþ 1, bÞ ≤Rðaþ 1, bþ 1Þ þ Rða, bÞ ð12Þ
Similarly, Eq. (12) can be rewritten in the continuum limit as ∂
2Rða, bÞ
∂a∂b ≥ 0.
Any individual would prefer to increase the value of its current ranking Rn(an,bn) (for n = 1,2)
by changing his/her state parameters an and bn (by producing and trading goods).
That is, if Rnðan, bnÞ > Rnðan, bnÞ, then the nth producer would prefer the state (an,bn) over the
state ðan, bnÞ. Clearly, if both an > an and bn > bn, then Rnðan, bnÞ > Rnðan, bnÞ; however, in many
cases, the ranking is improved even when an > an but bn < bn or when an < an and bn > bn,
which depends on the subjective ranking of both individuals.
Prior to trading the producer needs to produce the goods. The decision on the amount to
produce depends on the ranking matrix under the relevant constrictions (1) and (2).
In Figure 1, such a two-dimensional ranking matrix is illustrated. For simplicity, we assume
that the two producers have the same ranking, i.e. R1(a,b) = R2(a,b) for any (a,b); however, this is
not a restrictive assumption. Despite the fact that in this example, the two producers have
the same preference ranking, their production’s decision is different due to their different
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production abilities (different PPFs). Trading will take place provided there are ∆a and ∆b,
which can be either positive or negative, so that
R1ða1  Δa, b1 þ ΔbÞ > R1ða1, b1Þ ð13Þ
R2ða2 þ Δa, b2  ΔbÞ > R2ða2, b2Þ ð14Þ
In the example presented in Figure 1, A2 = 7, B2 = 10, A1 = 6 and B1 = 3. Therefore, without
trading, the best ranking that the production constrains allow for the first producer is
R1ða1 ¼ 4, b1 ¼ 1Þ ¼ 27 and for the second producer is R2ða2 ¼ 4, b2 ¼ 4Þ ¼ 57. Since
0:7 ¼ A2=B2 < A1=B1 ¼ 2, there is an advantage for the first producer to produce extra units
of A and to sell them to the second producer for units of B.
In Figure 1, two such options are presented. In both cases the producers decided to specialise
in a single product, the one which they have a comparative advantage with. By specialising
they knowingly decreases temporarily their preference ranking. The preference ranking of the
first producer reduces temporarily from the maximum 27 to 16, and the ranking of the second
producer reduces from the maximum value 57 to 24. After trading, there is a substantial
increase in the preference ranking. In the left scenario, the first producer’s preference ranking
increases to 40 and that of the second one increases to 68. It is shown that if the second
producer wishes to increase its preference ranking even further to 70, it must be on the account
of a substantial reduction in the preference ranking of the first producer (to 28), albeit it is still
higher than the pre-trading maximum ranking (27). As was emphasised in Mises and
Rothbard writings [9, 10], the final state depends on the bargaining merits of the two pro-
ducers (now merchants). However, while Mises and Rothbards emphasised that the price is a
matter of bargaining, they ignored the fact that the amount of exchange good is also a matter of
bargaining even for the same price. In the two scenarios, which are presented in Figure 1, the
Figure 1. Two possible scenarios of trading. In the scenario on the left, the two producers temporally worsen their
ranking, which decreases from 27 and 57 (without trading) to 16 and 24, respectively, to increase it to 40 and 68,
respectively, after trading. On the right, the number of units, which exchange hands, was increased. As a result, the
ranking of the first producer decreases to 28 but the ranking of the second producer increases to 70.
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exchange price is the same, however, there is a difference in the number of units, which took
place in the exchange. In both cases the price is 1 (1 units of A for 1 units of B), however, while
the first producer prefers exchanging 5 units, the second producer prefers exchanging 6 units.
So, the bargaining is not on the price but on the number of units, and the problem is that when
the first one gains the second one losses and vice versa. This contradiction of wants did not
occur in Mises and Rothbard writings because they did not take the preference ranking into
account.
In Figure 2, we see two additional behaviours, which were neglected or ignored in previous
writings. In the left panel, we can see a scenario in which non-specialisation yields better
outcomes to both participants. The preference ranking of the first producer is improved (from
28 in the right panel of Figure 1 to 30), and even the second producer gains, for this production
scheme (1 unit of A and 8 units of B), do not consume all his temporal resources (since 8/10 + 1/
7 < 1).
In the right panel of Figure 2, all the possible outcomes after trading are plotted by light
circles. As can be easily seen, not all options, which were predicted by the LA are allowed
and again the discrepancy is the fact that the traditional LA ignores the subjective preference
scaling. For example, consider the scenario, in which they both specialise, i.e., the first pro-
ducer produces 6 units of A and the second producer produces 10 units of B, and then 2 units
of A are exchanged for 2 units of B. On the face of it, if the LA is considered, this is a legitimate
transaction. However, while the first producer gains from that exchange (his preference rank-
ing increases from the previous maximum of 27 to 41), the second producer clearly loses (from
57 to 51), and therefore, he/she will have no motivation to participate in such a transaction. He/
she may, however, decide to produce 2 units of A and 7 of units of B and then trade 2 (or even
better 3) units of A to 2 (or 3) units of B. In which case, they both gain (the first producer’s
preference ranking increases to 41 or 42 and the preference ranking of the second one increases
to 66 or 67).
Figure 2. On the left panel, the final scenario is better than the right scenario in Figure 1 despite the fact that the second
producer produces less. On the right panel all the final trading scenarios are plotted. Due to the ranking matrix not every
transaction is possible.
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In the previous ranking, the matrix was approximately symmetric with respect to the diagonal
(for example, the ranking of 7 units of A and 2 of B is 50, while the ranking of 2 units of A and 7
of B is similar, i.e. 49). In Figure 3, this pseudo symmetry is broken. In the two scenarios, which
are presented in Figure 3, the two producers clearly prefer units of A over units of B, and
therefore trading is substantially depressed. In the left scenario, there is only one option for
trading, and in any case, there is no clear motivation to the second producer to produce more
units of B.
In the right scenario of trading is suppressed completely. The first producer cannot make
anything which can motivate the second producer to trade with. In this latter scenario, the
suppression of trading reduces also the motivation for the division of labour. Both producers
behave like separate entities.
5. Dynamics
The main dilemma, which the producers must resolve, is that by specialisation they have to
take a risk. When they specialise, they produce too many products which they do not need,
and therefore, they temporarily reduce their preference ranking. The source of the problem is
that they do not know the preference ranking of the other producers. It seems contradictory to
base specialisation on subjective analysis, since if the producer is familiar only with his own
preference scale, then how can he judge, what would the other producer want to buy from
him?
Clearly, in a single trading event, this dilemma has no solution; however, in successive trading
events (multiple iterations), the dilemma is solved, since objective information is transferred via
the price of the previous trade.
Figure 3. Two asymmetric scenarios. Despite the fact that there is a clear comparative advantage of the two producers,
and in principle there are numerous trading options, in practice, due to the asymmetry between the utility of the two
commodities (commodity A is more desirable than commodity B); then, the trading options are extremely limited. In the
left panel there is only one option for trading, and in the right panel there is none.
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The producers/traders follow the following algorithm. The algorithm consists of three stages:
the initial condition, the entrepreneurial stage, and the bargaining stage. The last two stages (B
and C) are repeated iteratively between one trading event and the next.
A. Initial state
n = 0 (iteration number)
Initial production values
a
ð0Þ
1 ¼ a

1, b
ð0Þ
1 ¼ b

1, a
ð0Þ
2 ¼ a

2, b
ð0Þ
2 ¼ b

2 (the asterisks stand for the best values prior to trading)
Initial price value
ΔAð0Þ ¼ ΔA, ΔBð0Þ ¼ ΔB (the initial price is guessed by the producers)
B. Entrepreneurial stage
n nþ 1 (increment the iteration index)
Each producer checks different production working points, i.e. they check the effect of differ-
ent increment/decrement ∆a1 and ∆a2 (under the constrain of fixed prices, i.e. given ∆A
(n1) and
∆B(n1)).
Mathematically, it means vary ∆a1 and if
R1

a
ðn1Þ
1 þ Δa1  ΔA
ðn1Þ, b1 a
ðn1Þ
1 þ Δa1
h i
þ ΔBðn1Þ

> R1

a
ðn1Þ
1 , b1 a
ðn1Þ
1
h i
then
a
ðnÞ
1 ¼ a
ðn1Þ
1 þ Δa1
Similarly, vary ∆a2 and if
R2

a
ðn1Þ
2  Δa2 þ ΔA
ðn1Þ, b2 a
ðn1Þ
2 þ Δa2
h i
 ΔBðn1Þ

> R2

a
ðn1Þ
2 , b2 a
ðn1Þ
2
h i
Then,
a
ðnÞ
2 ¼ a
ðn1Þ
2 þ Δa2:
where b1[x] and b2[x] represents the production frontiers of the two producers, i.e.
b1½x ≤ f loor½B1ð1 x=A1Þ
b2½x ≤ f loor½B2ð1 x=A2Þ
where floor[] is the floor rounding function (rounds the argument to the nearest integers
towards minus infinity).
Emerging Issues in Economics and Development56
*Note that in this stage, every producer’s decisions depend only on his/her own preference
ranking matrix.
C. Bargaining stage
During the bargaining stage, the price values (∆A and ∆B) vary until both conditions
R1

a
ðnÞ
1  ΔA, b1 a
ðnÞ
1
h i
þ ΔB

> R1

a
ðn1Þ
1 , b1 a
ðn1Þ
1
h i
and
R2

a
ðnÞ
2 þ ΔA, b2 a
ðnÞ
2
h i
 ΔB

> R2

a
ðn1Þ
2 , b2 a
ðn1Þ
2
h i
apply.
In which case
ΔA
ðnÞ  ΔA
ΔBðnÞ  ΔB
D. Update the parameters and go back to the entrepreneurial stage (B)
It should be stressed that the iterations are essential for successful trading. Without iterations
no knowledge can be transmitted between the producers, and the entrepreneurial act would be
futile. A similar iterative process can formalise the Mengerian [14] and Misesian [15] origin of
money.
6. The effect of specialisation
Plato [16] attributed the division of labour to the diversity in people’s merits, i.e., the baker
specialises in making bread, while the carpenter specialises in making tables because the baker
has a talent for making bread and the carpenter has the talent for making tables. Smith [17]
emphasised that the division of labour does not rely on diversity in the population inborn
talents. The division of labour itself is beneficial and creates wealth to the community.
The classical LA does not take this effect into consideration. But the comparative advantage
itself is a function of specialisation.
If when specialising the first producer can produce A1 units of commodity A or B1 units of
commodity B, it does not mean that he/she can produce A1/2 units of A and B1/2 units of B. In
fact, the joint production must be lower than that.
Therefore, formulation of the production possibility frontier by a straight line is a very loose
constrain. In fact, the real constrain curve is more convex; an example of which is illustrated in
Figure 4.
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We therefore present here, to the best of our knowledge, for the first time a mathematical
presentation of a more realistic formulation of the production frontiers. Instead of Eqs. (1) and
(2), the PPF can be written
a1
A1
 α1
þ
b1
B1
 β1
≤ 1 and
a2
A2
 α2
þ
b2
B2
 β2
≤ 1 ð15Þ
where α1, β1, α2 and β2 are constants smaller than 1.
In this case, the generic dynamics are essentially similar to the previous section except for the
change in the production frontiers, namely
b1½x ≤ f loor B1 1
x
A1
 α1 1=β1( )
and b2½x ≤ f loor B2 1
x
A2
 α2 1=β2( )
: ð16Þ
It can easily be shown that if α = β, then the production is increased by a factor (see Figure 4)
F ¼ 21=α1: ð17Þ
In other words, if without specialisation the production frontier is bounded by a/A + b/B = 1,
and specialisation increases its production by a factor of F, then the new production frontier
under specialisation is
a
AF
 αðFÞ
þ
b
BF
 αðFÞ
¼ 1 when αðFÞ ¼
1
1þ log2F
: ð18Þ
In Figure 4, the effect of specialisation on the production frontier is illustrated for F = 1.5, which
corresponds to α = 0.6309.
Figure 4. The effect of specialisation on the production frontier. The dashed line corresponds to the case before speciali-
sation (in this case A = 2 and B = 3), while the solid curve stands for the convex production frontier in the presence of
specialisation with the specialisation production gain factor of F = 1.5 (for which case α ¼ 0:6309).
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In Figure 5, for example, α1 ¼ α2 ¼ β1 ¼ β2 ¼ 0:5, which according to Eq. (17) corresponds to a
production gain factor of F = 2. In general, the better the specialisation or the longer the
internship required, the smaller is the related exponent, for example, if the second producer is
an expert in producing A, then α1 is small.
In this scenario, prior to trading, the first producer chooses to produce only six units of A and
the second producer only two units of A and two of B. However, the knowledge of possible
future trading persuade the second producer to abandon the production of A and to specialise
only in B. After trading their preference, ranking is improved considerably from 16 to 40 for
the first producer and from 25 to 68 for the second one.
The convexity of the specialisation curve increases dramatically the trading possibilities. As the
right panel of Figure 5 illustrates (compare it to Figure 2), there is another important conclu-
sion from this analysis. The specialisation itself creates the incentive for exchange. In the
classical LA, there should be a diversity in the producers’ abilities. But this analysis demon-
strates that even if the producers are initially identical in any respect, i.e. they have the same
preference schedule (same ranking) and the same production constrains, the convexity of the
production frontier creates the incentive for exchange.
For example, suppose the two producers have the same production capabilities, i.e. their
production constrains are:
ffiffiffi
a
7
r
þ
ffiffiffiffiffi
b
10
r
≤ 1 ð19Þ
where a and b stand for both producers, i.e. for either (a1,b1) and (a2,b2).
Figure 5. The effect of specialisation on the constrain curves and on the possibilities for trading. Due to specialisation, the
production constrains curve become convex. On the left panel such a scenario is illustrated. The dotted and the solid
curves represent the production boundaries of the first and second producers, which in the absence of trading the
maximum achievable preference ranking is 16 and 25, respectively. With the possibility of trading the motivation for
specialisation increases. Specialisation temporarily reduces the ranking of the second producer to 24, and after trading
their ranking increases to 40 and 68, respectively. In the right panel all the possible trading scenarios are presented by light
circles.
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In which case without trading, they both prefer to produce two units of both A and B (gaining
a ranking 25); however, this is not a stable situation, because the first entrepreneur, which will
decide to produce more than 5 (6–10) units of B, which should not be too complicated a task,
because his/her production limit is 10 units of B, can trade 2 (or more) units of B for a single
units of A and to improve his/her preference ranking at least to 26. A similar argument applies
to an entrepreneur, who decides to manufacture more than 5 units of A. He/she can trade 2 (or
more) units of A for a single unit of B and to improve his/her ranking to (at least) 27. Moreover,
the process cannot stop here, while one entrepreneur decides to specialise in one commodity,
the motivation for the second one to specialise in the other commodity increases. The dynamic
process, which is described in Section 5, can stop only at full production (note that leisure
cannot be regarded as a commodity in this simple model) when one produces 7 units of A and
the other produces 10 units of B. The eventual state of the two producers depends on their
bargaining skills and cannot be determined a priori.
7. Instabilities
When applying the entrepreneurial-trading algorithm (Section 5) on the specialisation case, it
can be shown that stable state in the absence of trading, i.e. the state the producer choose
without the option of trading, becomes unstable in the case of trading. We will show that
despite the fact that the two producers are identical (α1 = α2, β1 = β2 and R1 = R2), the non-
trading status is unstable, the logic of which was explained in the previous section. In this
section, it will be shown mathematically.
For simplicity we choose α = β (Eq. (18)) for both producers, but it can easily be generalised to
α 6¼ β. Moreover, to simplify the analysis we use dimensionless variables, i.e. Eq. (18) can be
rewritten as
ξα þ ηα ¼ 1, ð20Þ
where ξ  a=AF and η  b=BF.
Now, suppose that prior to trading the highest preference ranking is reached at ξ0  a0=AF
and η0  b0=BF. Any decision to deviate from this optimal point will worsen their status and
reduce their ranking. However, the deviations are not symmetric, i.e. if one producer decides
to produce more of A, i.e. ξ0 þ δ and the other decides to produce less, i.e. ξ0  δ then, for an
arbitrary small perturbation δ their production of B corresponds to
ηbef oreðξ0  δÞ ffi ð1 ξ
α
0 Þ
1=α
∓ δξα10 ð1 ξ
α
0 Þ
1=α1 þ
1
2
δ2ð1 αÞξα20 ð1 ξ
α
0 Þ
1=α2 ð21Þ
The subscript stands for ’before trading‘.
Since ðξ0,η0Þ is the point with the highest ranking, then at this point the gradient of the
ranking matrix is perpendicular to the slope of the production frontier, i.e. any advancement
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in the normal direction (perpendicular to the production frontier) will necessarily improve the
producers’ ranking.
The trading occurs in the linear regime, i.e. δ units of ξ can be traded for δξα10 ð1 ξ
α
0 Þ
1=α1
units of η, i.e. for the price
ΔB=ΔA ¼ BΔη=AΔξ ¼ ðB=AÞξα10 ð1 ξ
α
0 Þ
1=α1: ð22Þ
Therefore, after trading their status exceeds the production frontier (see Figure 6)
ηaf terðξ0  δÞ ffi ð1 ξ
α
0 Þ
1=α þ
1
2
δ2ð1 αÞξα20 ð1 ξ
α
0 Þ
1=α2 > ηðξ0Þ ð23Þ
whose distance from the production frontier is approximately
ΔD ffi
1
2
δ2
ð1 αÞξα20 ð1 ξ
α
0 Þ
1=α2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ξ2α20 ð1 ξ
α
0 Þ
2=α2  1
q : ð24Þ
Thus, we see that if trading is an option, then the stable maximum ranking point ðξ0,η0Þ
becomes unstable, since any deviation from this point will necessarily improve the producers’
ranking.
8. Summary and conclusions
The law of association is well known as one of the most fundamental laws in economics. It is
traditionally believed that advantage, either absolute of comparative, is a sufficient condition
Figure 6. Illustration of the instability created by specialisation. The circle represents the pre-trading stable point
ðξ0 ¼ 0:5,η0 ¼ 0:0858Þ, the diamonds represents the perturbed (Eq. (21) with δ= 0.2) pre-trading condition. The arrows
describe the trading process (from the diamonds to the asterisk, which represents Eq. (23)). The dashed curves represents
indifference curves, while the solid curve stands for the production frontier.
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for trading. It is shown in this chapter that one of the sources of this belief is that no subjective
analysis is used in the derivation of the LA. This is a major flaw in the law’s derivation, since it
is well known that the utility is a subjective property and any fundamental law should be
based on subjective grounds.
We first presented the traditional law of association (Section 2). In the absence of subjective
analysis, we used the distance from the production frontier to quantify the improvement in the
status of both producers as a consequence of specialisation and trading (Section 3). Using this
tool, we derive the price, in which the gain of both producers is the same.
Then, we present an analysis, which is based on subjective preference ranking. It is shown that
comparative advantage is an insufficient condition for trading (Section 4).
In Section 5, we present the dynamic of the process, which is based on subjective analysis. The
object of this section is to answer one of the main dilemmas in specialisation—the lack of
information regarding the other producers’ preference ranking. An algorithm, which solves
this dilemma, is presented, where the information is carried via the objective price level of the
previous trading.
In Section 6, we investigate the effect of specialisation, which is also absent in the traditional
analysis of the LA. It is shown that the specialisation bend the production frontier to a convex
curve (a novel mathematical presentation for this bending is suggested). As a consequence, the
motivation for trading increases, and therefore, there is no need for any advantage (absolute or
comparative) to encourage trading. The producers can have identical production frontier and
identical preference ranking and yet they would prefer to trade.
In Section 7, we show that specialisation breaks the stability of the pre-trading status, and
creates trading opportunities even when the producers are identical.
Thus, when subjective considerations are introduced to the analysis, advantage between pro-
ducers is neither necessary nor sufficient a condition for trading.
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